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NOTES

REGULATING CHANNEL CHECKS:
CLARIFYING THE LEGALITY OF
SUPPLY-CHAIN RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC)
began investigating an investment research practice known as “channel
checking” to determine whether, in the SEC’s view, the practice violated
the laws prohibiting trading illegally on the basis of material, non-public
information, known informally as illegal insider trading. 1 In a channel
check, an investment analyst communicates with suppliers and clients, as
well as current and former employees of a company to obtain clues about
the company’s performance. 2 The practice is most common among
technology analysts, who often attempt to estimate how many product units
a company like Apple expects to ship in the next quarter.3 Analysts also use
channel checks to estimate the future performance and profitability of
companies in other sectors, especially large retail and restaurant chains. 4
Channel checks help keep issuers honest, as it is not uncommon for a
company to paint a rosy picture of its performance in the news, only to
eventually reveal that sales are down, cash flow has dried up, and senior
managers are using the company jet to ship their wives to Paris for fashion
week.
Channel checking has long been an industry-accepted practice, but the
SEC’s investigation has caused concern among buy-side and third-party
investment analysts for whom it is an important tool. 5 Many professional
investors, including hedge funds and investment advisers, are pulling back
from the use of supply-chain research, channel checks, and expert
networking firms. 6
1. Susan Pulliam, Supply Data Now a Focus of Probe, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703730304575633173086330184.html.
2. Bruce Carton, Who’s Checking Your Channel?, SEC. DOCKET (Dec. 8, 2010, 7:15 AM),
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/12/08/who%E2%80%99s-checking-your-channel/.
3. Alexis C. Madrigal, What’s a ‘Channel Check,’ Anyway?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 24, 2010,
11:55 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/11/whats-a-channel-checkanyway/67017/.
4. See Todd Wallack, Keeping Track on Black Friday; Analysts Visit Stores, Count Cars to
Find Trends, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2011, at A1.
5. See Is “Channel Checking” Illegal Insider Trading?, FRAUD FILES BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://www.sequenceinc.com/fraudfiles/2010/12/is-channel-checking-illegal-insider-trading/.
6. Evelyn M. Rusli, Scrutiny of Expert Networks Loosens Links; Window on Wall Street,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 13, 2011, at 24.
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This Note seeks to examine the investment research practice known as
channel checking within the context of insider trading law and proposes an
appropriate regulatory framework. It will also touch on and analyze the
proper role of expert networking firms in channel checks to provide a
clearer picture of how to prevent such firms from facilitating trading on
illegally obtained insider information. The analysis will examine and
critique the policy goals of current insider trading law and explain where
channel checks and expert networks fit in. Finally, the proposed solutions
will attempt to balance the competing interests of market fairness and
market efficiency.
Part I of this Note will provide a discussion of the current insider
trading regime, with a truncated explanation of the judicial recognition of
the insider’s duty to disclose or abstain, the development and expansion of
tipper/tippee liability, and an introduction to the misappropriation theory of
insider trading. Part II will comment on the current cases dealing with the
use of supply-chain information in trading. Part III will explore the current
legal status of supply-chain research, expert networks, and the mosaic
theory of investment analysis. Part IV will identify and comment on some
of the problems with the current enforcement regime. Part V will propose a
solution based on principles of market efficiency and the constitutional
authority of the SEC.
I. THE CURRENT INSIDER TRADING REGIME
Perhaps no form of white-collar crime has captured the public
imagination as fully as illegal insider trading: “Insider trading is one of the
few issues in securities regulation that has become a matter of cultural
symbolism as well as legal controversy.” 7 The very phrase “insider trading”
conjures up images of wealthy executives sitting in glass-walled towers,
lining their pockets at the expense of ordinary investors. In fact, much of
the modern era of enforcement can be attributed to a legislative desire to
punish the perceived greed of the already-rich using inside information to
further build their wealth.8
The phrase “insider trading” may refer to two separate types of trading,
one of which is perfectly legal. 9 On one hand, it is perfectly legal for
corporate insiders to sell their company’s stock, as long as they file reports
with the SEC and comply with regulations designed to prevent the misuse
of nonpublic information. 10 On the other hand, illegal insider trading as
governed by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
7. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PREVENTION § 1.1 (2012).
8. Id.
9. See Insider Trading, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2014).
10. Id.
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Exchange Act) occurs when a corporate insider or temporary insider, in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities, knowingly omits or fails to
disclose material facts to his counterparty. 11 In a modern securities
transaction, this means that an insider must disclose any material facts he
possesses to the market before trading in securities of his own company, or
he must abstain from trading altogether.12
The government has a number of statutes it can use to prosecute
suspected insider traders, including section 16 of the Exchange Act, 13 the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), 14 various mail and wire
fraud statutes, and, less frequently, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO). 15 The most important statute in modern cases,
and the one most relevant to this Note, is section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, 16 and SEC rule 10b-5 thereunder, prohibiting the use of manipulative
and deceptive devices in connection with any purchase or sale of a
security. 17 The Exchange Act, from which the SEC derives its constitutional
authority to prosecute insider trading and other forms of securities fraud,
does not specifically prohibit insider trading. 18 The SEC added rules 10b51 19 and 10b5-2 20 in order to clarify its position on misappropriation of

11. ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING
FIELD 108–09 (1993).
12. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (Nov. 8, 1961)
[hereinafter Cady, Roberts & Co. Release].
13. NASSER ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSELL, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
INSIDER TRADING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 43 (1993).
14. Id. at 49. The ITSA allows the SEC to seek a civil penalty of up to three times profit or
loss avoided for those found guilty of insider trading. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (2012).
15. ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 54.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

18. SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 3.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2014) defines trading “on the basis of” material nonpublic

information as follows:

Definition of “on the basis of.” Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph (c) of this
section, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is “on the basis of” material nonpublic
information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware
of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale.

20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (“For purposes of this section, a ‘duty of trust or confidence’
exists in the following circumstances, among others: (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain
information in confidence . . . .”).
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insider trading and make enforcement against such activity easier. 21 The
modern constitutional contours of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are wholly
defined by Chiarella v. United States, Dirks v. SEC, and United States v.
O’Hagan, the only three insider trading cases heard by the Supreme Court
in the modern era. 22
In the first case, Vincent Chiarella, a mark-up man in the employ of a
financial printer, was assigned to review a number of takeover proposals. 23
Chiarella was able to deduce the takeover targets from the content of the
proposals, despite the fact that the names of the target companies were
obscured or altered. 24 He then purchased shares in the target companies and
sold them after the takeovers were made public, netting about $30,000.25 In
this decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 1980, the Court sharply
limited the “disclose-or-abstain” rule proposed by the SEC. 26 The Court
held that a person trading on material, non-public information commits
illegal insider trading only if he had a duty to his counterparty to disclose
the information beforehand. 27 Such a duty arises from a corporate insider’s
fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders. 28 Under the Chiarella
standard, non-insiders who learn of material, non-public information have
no duty to disclose before trading on that information. 29 This had the effect
of doing away with the “parity of information” standard, in which any
investor with material information has a duty to disclose that information
before trading on the basis of that information. 30 In striking down the parity
standard, the Court denied the existence of a general duty between market
participants to abstain from trading on material, non-public information and

21. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure Release].
22. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 46–47.
23. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. In the Cady, Roberts & Co. Release, supra note 12, the SEC argued:
Insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but
which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a
violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to effecting a
purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the
alternative is to forego the transaction.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
Id.
Id.
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); see also SZOCKYJ, supra
note 11, at 44.
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noted that “neither Congress nor the [SEC] ever has adopted a parity-ofinformation rule.” 31
Dirks v. SEC expanded the definition of an insider but also placed an
important restriction on the transmission of a duty to disclose or abstain
from an inside “tipper” to an outside “tippee.” 32 In that case, Raymond
Dirks, a prominent insurance industry investment analyst, received a tip
from a former officer of Equity Funding of America. 33 The officer, Ronald
Secrist, stated that the value of Equity Funding’s assets had been
significantly overstated due to a massive and ongoing fraud at his former
employer. 34 Secrist also told Dirks that securities regulators had been
informed and had taken no action, and he asked Dirks to verify his
allegations independently. 35 Dirks did so and passed on his findings to a
number of his clients. 36 Dirks also went to the Wall Street Journal with the
information he uncovered about the fraud, but the reporter declined to
publish the story, apparently fearing a libel lawsuit. 37 Subsequently, several
of the clients Dirks tipped off sold their interests in Equity Funding, thereby
avoiding massive losses. 38 The SEC found that Dirks had engaged in illegal
insider trading as a tipper, but, in recognition of his role in bringing the
Equity Funding scandal to light, only censured him. 39 Dirks appealed,
perhaps recognizing the grave damage that even the relatively light sanction
would do to his reputation as an investment analyst, and ultimately the
Supreme Court overturned his conviction. 40 In deciding that Dirks could not
be held liable for insider trading, the Court held that tippees only inherit the
Cady, Roberts 41 duty to disclose when they receive material nonpublic
information improperly, that is, from a person who breaches his or her
fiduciary duty by passing along the information. 42 Secrist had not violated
any duty to his employer because he neither expected to nor actually
received any benefit by disclosing his company’s fraud to Dirks. 43
In 1997, the Supreme Court expanded the law of insider trading when it
upheld the securities fraud conviction of James H. O’Hagan. 44 O’Hagan had
31. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. The parity of information standard had been formulated and
adopted by the appellate court in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
32. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661–62 (1983).
33. Id. at 649–50.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 650.
38. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 650–52 (majority opinion).
40. Id. at 652.
41. See supra note 26; see also SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968);
SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 40–43.
42. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655–56.
43. Id. at 662.
44. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The Supreme Court had previously heard
a case involving the misappropriation theory in 1987, Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19
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been a partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP and obtained information about a
pending tender offer that his firm was working on. 45 Although O’Hagan did
no work on the representation, and as such was not a temporary insider,46 he
was convicted of insider trading. 47 In upholding the conviction, the Court
noted that a fiduciary who “[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly
converting the principal’s information for personal gain . . . dupes or
defrauds the principal,” 48 and further that “[a] company's confidential
information, we recognized in Carpenter, qualifies as property to which the
company has a right of exclusive use.” 49 These Supreme Court decisions
indicate that the Court views insider trading as a crime consisting of fraud
and involving breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, that is, the theft of
information and the transformation of that information into profit or
avoidance of loss. 50
II. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INSIDER TRADING LAWS
Several policy concerns have been advanced as an explanation for the
current insider trading regime. 51 Chief among these are fairness, the
promotion of investor confidence in the marketplace, and the right of
corporations to have exclusive use of their intellectual property. 52 The
fairness justification is premised on the idea that insider trading harms
shareholders and is fundamentally unfair to investors without the same
access to information that insiders possess. 53 As noted above, the Supreme
Court rejected the fairness justification when it refused to recognize a
general duty between market participants in Chiarella. 54 The Court returned
to this theme again when it decided Dirks v. SEC:
(1987), in which R. Foster Winans’ conviction for insider trading was upheld. The Court
deadlocked 4–4 on the issue of whether Winans could be held liable for misappropriation but
voted to uphold his wire fraud conviction.
45. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
46. A temporary insider is an outsider like an investment banker, accountant, outside attorney,
or broker who comes to possess a corporate client’s confidential information in the course of his
duties to the client. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. Such individuals are prohibited from trading on
this information on the same theory as “traditional” insiders. See id.
47. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
48. Id. at 653.
49. Id. at 654 (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19).
50. Not all insider trading cases involve a breach of duty or conversion. The SEC has
promulgated rule 14e-3, which provides for the prosecution of persons who trade ahead of a
tender offer, no matter where the information comes from and whether or not the trader is
affiliated with either the offeror or the target. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2014). The constitutionality
of this rule has been challenged, but the O’Hagan Court held that, at least with respect to that
particular case, the SEC did not exceed its constitutional rulemaking authority. O’Hagan, 521
U.S. at 644.
51. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
21–26 (1991); see also ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 130–34.
52. See MACEY, supra note 51, at 23–24.
53. Id.
54. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
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[O]ur opinion in Chiarella [repudiated] any notion that traders must enjoy
equal access to information before trading: “[The] ‘information’ theory is
rejected. Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches
only when a party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply
with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws.” We
reaffirm today that “[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship
between parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire
55
information because of his position in the market.”

Why then does the fairness theory of enforcement retain such
significant popularity with the SEC and Congress? One reason is that the
public perceives insider trading as “cheating,” 56 a method of trading and
making money not available to the general public; this is combined with a
historic lack of organized industry opposition. 57 Another more cynical
interpretation of the fairness theory’s survival and continued popularity is
that it plays well in the media and allows the SEC to maintain its power,
influence, and moral high ground within the federal government and the
financial industry. 58 Insider trading cases, focused as they generally are on
one or a group of individuals as opposed to a monolithic firm, have the
advantage of character and personal drama to pique the public’s interest and
keep the regulator and U.S. Attorney in the spotlight. 59 Finally, there is the
notion that insider trading results in identifiable harm to investors and
shareholders. The Supreme Court commented on this in the Dirks case:
[I]n many cases there may be no clear causal connection between inside
trading and outsiders’ losses. In one sense, as market values fluctuate and
investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect information, there are
always winners and losers; but those who have “lost” have not necessarily
been defrauded. On the other hand, inside trading for personal gain is
60
fraudulent, and is a violation of the federal securities laws.

The lack of demonstrable harm to any one investor is dealt with by the
“property right” theory of insider trading. 61 The right of a corporation to
have exclusive use of its proprietary information, in the nature of a property
right, is the theoretical basis for the illegality of the misappropriation
theory. 62 The theory can also be applied to classical insider trading; such an
adaptation goes something like this: “[F]irms often incur great expense to
develop [their] information. To deny these firms the ability to exploit this
information fully for profit diminishes the wealth of the shareholders who
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–58 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 2.
Id. at 24–26.
See id. at 28–31; see also MACEY, supra note 51, at 52.
MACEY, supra note 51, at 67–68.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666 n.27.
ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 129; see also MACEY, supra note 51, at 44–45.
MACEY, supra note 51, at 44–45.
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have paid for the creation of the information.”63 A property right conception
of insider trading means that any executive, director, or other insider
violates his fiduciary duty to his company by using corporate assets for his
own benefit, instead of for that of the company. 64 On the flip side, an
outsider owing a duty of trust and confidence to the company would be
liable for simple conversion of corporate intellectual property for his own
benefit. 65
Another plausible theoretical justification for insider trading
regulation is the notion that insider trading undermines the integrity of the
securities markets by reducing investor confidence in the fairness and
equity of those markets. 66 Investors will avoid the markets, the theory goes,
if they feel that they have little chance of competing with the inside
knowledge of insiders and the select few with whom they share their
information; potential market participants want a level playing field before
they will engage in securities trading. 67 This argument has been criticized
by some as a disguised retread of the fairness argument, replacing the value
proposition that equality of information is the only fair context for trading
in securities with the assertion that unless all parties believe they have equal
access to information, they will not trade.68 Investment analysts and other
securities market professionals constantly strive for an informational
advantage over their counterparties by collecting and analyzing all of the
publicly available information about a company in order to take advantage
of pricing inefficiencies in the company’s securities. 69 This group of market
professionals will always have an advantage over less-informed investors
by virtue of their superior research and analysis capabilities.70
One of the ways that market professionals maintain an informational
advantage is by using their superior resources to poke around in the guts of
companies in which they wish to invest.71 Many employ channel checkers
to track supply-chain information that could provide a window into a
company’s inner workings, or they engage in supply-chain channel checks
themselves. 72 However, recent commentary suggests that the SEC takes a
dim view of this practice, at least in situations where it leads to an analyst
learning confidential information about a company. 73
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 52.
ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 129.
See MACEY, supra note 51, at 44–45.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 23–24.
See id. at 43.
ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 131.
MACEY, supra note 51, at 41–42.
See Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.
Id.
Pradheep Sampath, “How’s Business?” Could be a Federal Offence, SUPPLY CHAIN EUR.,
Jan./Feb. 2011, at 50.
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III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CHANNEL CHECKS AND
SUPPLY-CHAIN RESEARCH
A. DEFINITION OF A CHANNEL CHECK AND COMMON USES IN
INVESTMENT RESEARCH
Channel checks take a number of forms, including conversations
between analysts and supply-side sources, independent surveys of franchise
outlets, aggregation of shipping or trucking data, and simply counting the
cars in the parking lot outside of Best Buy. 74 The checks under scrutiny are
those conducted between an investment analyst and a current or former
employee of a company engaged in supplying parts, expertise, or other
significant “building blocks” to a larger company. 75 The channel check is
an especially crucial tool for investment analysts because of the increasing
prevalence of production outsourcing; its importance is ably summed up by
Pradheep Sampath:
It’s a sign of the times that most companies don’t do most of their own
manufacturing; they use contract manufacturers, subcontractors and so on.
So, anyone wanting to find out how a company is performing has to go
beyond that company to get a quasi-decent picture of performance.
Financial analysts have ‘got’ this; so, particularly for the more secretive
and sensitive supply chains, they are delving ever deeper into the
manufacturers, distribution partners, and warehouse operations, looking at
production levels and raw material flows to piece together a picture from
which they can advise investors and other clients. They may not have got
all or any of this information from the ‘channel master,’ but such ‘channel
76
checkers’ have a leg up in the investment game.

Channel checks are not limited to technology companies. The method is
also useful to analysts who follow retailers, restaurant chains, and other
service-industry companies. 77 These analysts often visit stores and
restaurants to see how much traffic they get, what their prices look like
compared to the previous week or month, and any other information they
can glean. 78 In some cases, expert networking firms or third-party research
firms facilitate these conversations by connecting the analyst to an industry
expert or employee with relevant information; in other cases, these third
parties perform the research themselves and sell it to buy-side analysts. 79
Channel checks are part of the investment research that many financial
74.
75.
76.
77.

Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.
Madrigal, supra note 3.
Sampath, supra note 73, at 50.
Serena Ng, Channel Checkers Sniff Around for Trends, WALL ST. J. ASIA FELLOWSHIP
NYU (Aug. 8, 2005), http://wsjfellowship.com/2009/01/channel-checkers/.
78. Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.
79. See Jenny Anderson, Wall Street ‘Matchmakers’ Under New York Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2007, at C5; see also Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.
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analysts perform on public companies, either to identify potential
investment targets or evaluate a current position.80 It is not uncommon for
analysts and officers of financial firms that perform analysis to rely at least
in part on their channel checks when making a recommendation.81
B. THE MOSAIC THEORY
One of the ways that some analysts use information obtained by
channel checks is commonly referred to as “mosaic theory.” 82 Mosaic
theory is the practice of seeking out and combining all public and material
information, as well as non-public, non-material information, to paint a
larger picture of the company being targeted for investment.83 Also called
the “scuttlebutt method,” 84 an analyst employing a mosaic theory strategy
may seek out non-public information from within the target company. 85 As
long as the information does not rise to the level of material information,
such research is legal because the law only prohibits trading on information
if it is both material and non-public. 86
As a defense to insider trading allegations, mosaic theory is risky. Most
recently, Raj Rajaratnam claimed that his activities were the product of a
mosaic theory strategy. 87 One of the biggest risks is the loose term
“materiality,” which is sometimes defined as a fact that a reasonable
investor would view as having actual significance in deciding whether to
invest. 88 In general, things like top-line earnings, confidential company
performance numbers, and pending acquisitions or mergers are deemed
material as a matter of law. 89 Other facts that may or may not be deemed
material include possible credit events, changes in management, or changes
in regulatory expenses or structure. 90 In United States v. Rajaratnam, much
of the information Rajaratnam was accused of obtaining illegally was
clearly material, including a tip about Berkshire Hathaway’s September
2008 agreement to make a $5 billion investment in Goldman Sachs. 91
80. See Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.
81. See Ng, supra note 77.
82. Peter J. Henning, Why Insider Trading Is Wrong, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 11, 2011,

3:51 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/why-is-insider-trading-wrong/.
83. See Pradheep Sampath, Where Supply Chains Meet Insider Trading, ALL ABOUT B2B
(Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.gxsblogs.com/sampathp/2010/11/channel-check-where-supplychains-meet-insider-trading.html.
84. PHILIP A. FISHER, COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS 44–45 (1958).
85. Henning, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also Michael Rothfeld & Chad Bray, The Galleon Case: Loss Raises Questions
over Defense Strategy, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2011, at C1.
88. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (articulating the test for
“materiality” in the context of cases under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act).
89. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK
2011–2012, § 1.1.3 (Harry S. Davis ed., 2011).
90. Id. § 6.9.
91. United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 500 (2011).
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Rajaratnam’s attorneys, however, argued that the information was not
“economically” material, that is, it was already reflected in the stock prices
of the companies in which he traded. 92 Whether or not this argument is
plausible, it is becoming increasingly clear that the definition of materiality
is more or less whatever the government retroactively decides it should
be. 93 On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court and SEC have rejected
suggestions that they formulate a more concrete definition of materiality. 94
Though the practice is nominally legal, channel checkers who subscribe to
the mosaic theory put themselves in harm’s way because of the
government’s refusal to clarify its position. 95
C. EXPERT NETWORKS
Expert networks are consulting firms that specialize in connecting buyside investment analysts with industry experts or high-level employees from
industries and sectors in which they might wish to invest. 96 For example,
Integrity Research Associates performed a study on expert networking and
shared its findings:
Over two-thirds of all investors use expert networks primarily to obtain
market and company background pertaining to the various investment
theses they are researching. Following this, European users are most likely
to be interested in forecasts and macro/economic issues, while North
American users are most likely to be interested in current trends.
Accounting and legal issues are significantly more likely to be of interest
97
to North American users than their European counterparts.

The recent insider trading cases are not, however, focused on the use of
expert networks as background. They concern consultants and employees of
the expert networks who passed material, non-public information to hedge
funds and other investors. 98
The expert networking industry arose as an unintended consequence of
one of the SEC’s own regulations intended to even the playing field for
smaller investors—Regulation FD. 99 In the wake of Dirks v. SEC, the SEC
92. Peter J. Henning, A Standard That Raises More Questions than It Answers, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 7, 2011, 12:04 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/a-standard-thatraises-more-questions-than-answers/.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See Carton, supra note 2.
96. Anderson, supra note 79; see also Rusli, supra note 6, at 24.
97. Michael W. Mayhew, 2009 Expert Network Trends, INTEGRITY RES. ASSOCIATES (Nov.
16, 2009, 6:30 PM), http://www.integrity-research.com/cms/2009/11/16/2009-expert-networktrends/.
98. Michael W. Mayhew, Feds Agree: Expert Networks Are Okay, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 28,
2011, 5:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/feds-agree-expert-networks-okay-2011-2.
99. Selective Disclosure Release, supra note 21; Evelyn M. Rusli, Hardball Tactics Against
Insider Trading: Next Up: A Crackdown on Outside Expert Firms, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011, at
B1.
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was concerned that investment professionals regularly obtained material
information about issuers prior to disclosure to the general marketplace,
giving such professionals an unfair competitive advantage. 100 Regulation
FD was designed to prevent selective disclosure to certain analysts,
disclosure that the SEC believed gave those analysts and their employers an
unfair trading advantage. 101 Regulation FD cut off the flow of information
that analysts had come to rely on from top corporate executives by
forbidding selective disclosure to certain classes of persons, including
anyone associated with a broker-dealer. 102 In response, companies began
using channel checks, often with the help of third-party research firms, to
find out crucial supply data about their investment targets. 103 Many
companies are now pulling back from these expert networks out of fear of
being implicated in one of the current insider trading scandals.104 In fact,
some analysts predict that, without more clarity from the SEC on the limits
of an expert network’s uses, the entire industry could go belly-up. 105
1. SEC Commentary on the Use of Expert Networks
On February 3, 2011, the SEC announced that it would bring insider
trading charges against several consultants and employees of Primary
Global Research LLC, an expert networking firm. 106 In the announcement,
the SEC acknowledged that there was nothing inherently illegal about the
primary function of expert networks: providing expert advice and
analysis. 107 On February 8, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, Preet Bharara, stated that the government is only pursuing
systematic, brazen violations of the insider trading laws in the context of the
expert networking industry. 108 He also tacitly endorsed the practice of
channel checking by stating that there was “nothing inherently wrong with
or bad about hedge funds or expert networking firms or aggressive market
research for that matter. Nothing at all.” 109 When pressed, Bharara refused
to answer substantively a question about where the line was drawn between
experts and analysts’ “legitimate” conversations and the illegal sharing of
inside information. 110

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Selective Disclosure Release, supra note 21.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i) (2014).
Rusli, supra note 6, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Mayhew, supra note 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

482

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

Since Bharara and SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami refuse
to provide any more information about what will be considered material 111
or who will be pursued next, the way forward for analysts who use expert
networks is unclear. Khuzami urged companies who use expert networks to
increase compliance, without addressing the core issue of what constitutes
an illegal tip. 112 More troubling for the expert networking industry are
comments made in February 2012 by David Rosenfeld, Associate Regional
Director of the New York Regional Office of the SEC. 113 Rosenfeld stated
that no corporate executive should ever work with an expert network and
implied that such activity could violate Reg FD and the laws against insider
trading. 114
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT REGIME
A. LACK OF CLARITY ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF CHANNEL CHECKS
REDUCES THE AMOUNT AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO THE MARKET
Banning or disincentivizing aggressive research may limit the amount
of public information firms use in their analyses as they take precautionary
steps back. The costs of compliance and the amount of human capital
needed to ensure that expert networks and channel checkers are on the right
side of the insider trading laws are already enormous and growing rapidly
in the wake of the Primary Global Research cases. 115 Because it is still
unclear exactly where the line is drawn between research and improper
access to and use of inside information, large investors must sift through the
facts of each case and try not to engage in such behavior. 116 It is likely that
their analysis will lead them to create a “buffer” zone of legal investment
research left undone to insulate themselves from even the appearance of
impropriety, or firms may even eschew the services of research firms
altogether. 117 For example, it is perfectly legal for an employee at a given
company to discuss non-material, public information with an investor, as
long as his or her employer does not forbid that kind of contact. 118 Such
conversations have historically played an important role in channel
checks. 119 Without a clear definition of what qualifies as material
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Charlie Gasparino & Sital Patel, Exclusive: Regulators May Expand Definition of Insider

Trading, FOX BUS. (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/02/15
/regulators-may-expand-definition-insider-trading/.
114. Id.
115. Rusli, supra note 6, at 24.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Anderson, supra note 79, at C5.
119. See id.
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information, however, the investor may not call, and the employee may not
pick up. The legal definition of materiality is so vague that almost any
information passed from an insider carries risks both for the insider and the
analyst. 120 The SEC has also resisted providing a clearer definition of
materiality, apparently in order to broaden the types of conduct against
which it can bring enforcement actions. 121 Summed up in a few words, the
risk of unclear regulation is that it will be difficult for either party to tell
“which bits of information are ‘material’ and which are just ‘really
awesome,’” 122 since “[t]he gray area is vast.” 123
The effect of this lack of clarity will be to reduce the market’s
efficiency at pricing investment securities. 124 If information is excluded
from an analyst’s report or is never uncovered to begin with, the price of the
relevant security may not accurately reflect its true value in light of all the
public, material facts available.125 Efficient pricing is desirable because it
contributes to market liquidity and low-cost access to the securities markets,
allowing investors to buy securities safe in the knowledge that the price is
accurate. 126
The market efficiency argument, by its nature, ignores the “fairness”
justification for insider trading regulation, focusing only on the efficiency
benefits of allowing trading on inside information. 127 However, the broader
perception, shared by many at the SEC, is that unequal access to
information may be unfair to the small investor. 128 What justifies this
unequal access to information? The short answer, of course, is that such
large investors pay for it, either by paying their own analysts or a thirdparty research group. 129 Here there is another gray area between paying for
legitimate research and offering a bribe for inside information, the latter of
which was alleged in several of the Primary Global Research cases. 130
Some of the information allegedly passed from the consultants in those
cases, like quarterly revenue and gross profits, can be fairly classified as
material under almost any test. 131 Some consultants, however, passed along
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Henning, supra note 92.
Id.
Madrigal, supra note 3.
Id.
MACEY, supra note 51, at 11.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Sampath, supra note 73, at 50; see also ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 131
(discussing former SEC enforcement chief Stanley Sporkin’s belief that anyone with a strong
informational advantage with respect to a company should be forbidden from trading in that
company’s stock).
129. See Wallack, supra note 4, at A1.
130. E.g., Complaint at 13, 15, 20, 22, SEC v. Longoria, No. 11-CV-0753 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3,
2011), 2011 WL 324641 [hereinafter Longoria Complaint].
131. Id. at 20.
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information that was less clearly material, such as what orders a supplier
expected from a large client. 132 More importantly, the hedge fund clients
often declined to invest in the company whose information was
communicated but did invest in companies either up or down the supply
chain. 133 If the parity of information standard is applied, all of the conduct
just described appears illegal because it is unfair to investors who cannot
afford to purchase such information. This is a plausible argument, but it
does not comport with the current Supreme Court view of the grounds for a
misappropriation charge; a party must have, and violate, a fiduciary duty to
another by passing along or trading on information that is both material and
nonpublic. 134
The Supreme Court has also recognized that independent, aggressive
research is important to the efficiency and honesty of the securities
markets. 135 Indeed, the Court acknowledged that such analysis plays a
crucial role in keeping markets healthy and companies honest:
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly
receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which
the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy
market. It is commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze
information,” and this often is done by meeting with and questioning
corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the
analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
worth of a corporation’s securities . . . . [I]t is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information
cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s
136
stockholders or the public generally.

This analysis reaffirms the general principle that insider trading liability
is premised on a breach of fiduciary duty and not mere possession of
material, non-public information. Firms who engage in channel checking
and other aggressive research put money and time into developing and
synthesizing that research into a cohesive picture of an issuer’s structure,
performance, and attractiveness as an investment. 137 Must firms, in the
interest of fairness, disclose the product of such research to the public
before using it to avoid liability? Alternatively, must they expend even
more time and money to discover and quarantine inside information passed
132. Id. at 15.
133. See, e.g., id. at 16–18 (describing one consultant who confirmed that Apple’s new line of

iPhones would have two cameras and provided the confidential information to a recipient who
bought shares in Omnivision—a company that supplied cameras to Apple at that time).
134. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
135. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
136. Id. at 658–59.
137. MACEY, supra note 51, at 52.
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on inadvertently? 138 The first solution is problematic because it would result
in free-riding 139 and remove the incentive for firms to spend money on
analysts and research in order to gain a competitive advantage. Since
“information cannot be enjoyed in limitless quantities by everyone,
individuals and firms will not find it sensible to invest in producing
information if they cannot profit from it.” 140 The second may similarly
reduce the incentive to engage in aggressive research because it would
require firms to spend more money on compliance and legal analysis,
leaving less of a margin for profit. 141
The current regime may also result in prosecution of analysts
performing research in good faith and makes it significantly more difficult
for those analysts to effectively perform their research. 142 Analysts take
steps to protect themselves from liability but may come to possess inside
information accidentally. 143 Preet Bharara of the U.S. Attorney’s Office has
stated that the authorities are not pursuing those who do not intentionally
seek out inside information, 144 but neither he nor the SEC has articulated an
intelligible standard about what constitutes intent. The SEC has also cast a
wide net with respect to what qualifies as material, non-public information
and has seemingly expanded the definition of a duty of trust and confidence
to include non-disclosure agreements with suppliers or customers. 145 As
early as 1993, scholars noted that the vagueness of the insider trading
statutes incented the SEC to expand its reach,146 and the SEC has done so—
except in cases where it is halted by the Supreme Court. 147 The SEC
continues to insist that its definition of insider trading is clear enough, that
its rules provide a “bright line,” and that analysts should know when they
cross that line. 148

138. Id.
139. The term “free rider” refers to a person or entity who obtains a benefit from group

membership but does not share in the costs paid by the group to obtain such benefit. Robert
Albanese & David D. Van Fleet, Rational Behavior in Groups: The Free-Riding Tendency, 10
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 244, 244 (1985). In the context of this Note, the term refers to a hypothetical
situation in which a firm that spends money to develop information, later determined to be
confidential and material, would be forced to disclose such information to the wider market,
giving other investors the benefit of its research without those other investors being forced to
share in the costs.
140. MACEY, supra note 51, at 10.
141. See Henning, supra note 92.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Mayhew, supra note 98.
145. See, e.g., Longoria Complaint, supra note 130, at 62.
146. See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11.
147. Id.
148. Ashby Jones, Again, Expert-Networking Firm Is at Heart of Insider-Trading Case, WALL
ST. J.L. BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/11/20/once-againexpert-networking-firms-at-heart-of-insider-trading-allegations/.
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B. THE SEC LACKS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EXPAND THE
DEFINITION OF INSIDER TRADING
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
the government has sought to expand the definition of insider trading to
include possession and use of material, nonpublic information by any
person, sometimes known as the “fairness” standard. 149 The Texas Gulf
Sulphur court reasoned that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act could be
read to require that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to
protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such
150
inside information remains undisclosed.

Three Supreme Court cases since Texas Gulf Sulphur have limited insider
trading liability to those who have some species of fiduciary duty requiring
them to disclose or abstain.151
The basic limitations are these: to be liable for insider trading, an
individual must have, and breach, a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the
company in whose securities he proposes to trade, 152 or a fiduciary-like
duty of trust and confidence to the source of the inside information.153 An
individual who would otherwise meet neither standard inherits the duty to
disclose or abstain only if he received the inside information from a person
he knew had a duty not to share such information and the person sharing the
information in breach of his duty received a benefit from doing so. 154 The
equality of information standard urged by the SEC “differs little from the
view that [the Supreme Court] rejected as inconsistent with Congressional
intent in Chiarella.” 155 In the absence of the fiduciary duty requirement, the
SEC rule would have no limiting factor, exposing analysts to unrestrained
litigation risk; “without legal limitations, market participants are forced to

149. See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 107–08 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
“financial fairness” theory of insider trading).
150. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
151. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For a more in-depth discussion of these three
cases, see supra Part I.
152. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
153. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642; see also MACEY, supra note 51, at 54. (“A rational,
straightforward definition of insider trading is available from the Supreme Court, should
regulators and bureaucrats find the political will to make use of it. Those who abscond with
corporate information in breach of a preexisting fiduciary relationship should be punished. Those,
however, who expend the resources necessary to develop valuable information about a firm
should be allowed to profit from it.”).
154. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646.
155. Id. at 656.
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rely on the reasonableness of the SEC’s litigation strategy, but that can be
hazardous.” 156
The SEC’s investigation of channel checking is premised largely on the
notion that employees of supply companies who share information with
analysts do so in breach of an express or implied duty of confidentiality to
the customer. 157 This is analogous to the O’Hagan standard, 158 but it goes
too far. A finding of liability under O’Hagan requires that the accused have
misappropriated confidential, material, non-public information, in breach of
a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, for the purposes of
securities trading. 159 A fiduciary duty is defined as
[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a
fiduciary (such as a lawyer or corporate officer) to the beneficiary (such as
a lawyer’s client or a shareholder); a duty to act with the highest degree of
honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the
160
other person (such as the duty that one partner owes to another).

In the absence of a confidentiality agreement falling under rule 10b5-2, this
definition does not describe the nature of the relationship between an
employee of a given supplier and that supplier’s customer. An argument
could be made that, regardless of his duty to the customer, an employee
always owes such a duty to his employer as the employer’s agent; this is
accurate, but if the information in question is classified as the property of
the customer, passing it on does not breach a duty to the employer since it is
the customer, not the employer, who enjoys exclusive use under
O’Hagan. 161
One possible criticism of this line of reasoning is that the SEC has
historically been given broad authority by the courts to shape its regulatory
regime, especially in the context of insider trading. 162 The Supreme Court
held that the SEC did not exceed its authority in promulgating rule 14e-3,
which prohibits trading on inside information concerning a tender offer,
whether or not the trader had a duty to either the offeror or the offerees. 163
The rulemaking authority there specified that the SEC could make any rules
needed to prevent fraudulent conduct in connection with a tender offer. 164
However, in granting that authority through the passage of the Williams

156. Id. at 656 n.24.
157. Kit Eaton, Apple Analyst “Channel Checks” Now Under SEC Spotlight as Insider Trading,

FAST COMPANY (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1705110/apple-analyst-channelchecks-now-under-sec-spotlight-inside-trading.
158. O’Hagan, 463 U.S. at 666.
159. Id. at 652.
160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
161. O’Hagan, 463 U.S. at 652.
162. See id. at 668.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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Act, 165 Congress also noted that its preferred method of market regulation
was through disclosure rather than “court-imposed principles of
‘fairness.’” 166 The difference between the wording of section 10(b) and
Congress’s express intent to limit regulation on the grounds of fairness
suggests by counterfactual inference that rule 10b-5 still requires a nexus of
duty between an alleged insider trader/tipper and the owner of the
information. 167
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. THE SEC SHOULD FORMULATE GUIDELINES FOR
CHANNEL CHECKERS
To reduce the instances of insider trading, investors need guidance in
order to police themselves more effectively. Such guidelines should not
completely preclude aggressive, independent research. As noted earlier,
channel checks and other forms of independent research are an important
check on companies, preventing them from fooling the investment public
with vague or even inaccurate disclosure. 168 It is well known that
“[c]ompanies routinely claim to be doing well and do not like being
contradicted, but that is the task of investors, analysts and the media.” 169
Limiting such research must be done in a way that does not give companies
the ability to lie to the public and get away with it—independent research
can allow hedge funds and other market-moving investors to move the price
of an entity in a way that signals its overall financial health. Crippling the
research capabilities of large investors would render efforts to predict a
company’s future performance or current fair value “mere guesswork.” 170
Companies who wish to prevent channel checking may take steps to protect
their information by imposing non-disclosure agreements on their
suppliers. 171 In such a situation, SEC rule 10b5-2 would allow enforcement
actions against both the tipper and the tippee, provided the information is
material and non-public. 172 Otherwise, the SEC becomes a tool for
companies hiding damaging information. 173
The SEC has taken the position that a non-disclosure agreement creates
a relationship of trust and confidence sufficient to warrant a
misappropriation charge if breached. 174 However, at least one court has
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
O’Hagan, 463 U.S. at 668.
See id. at 666; see also Mayhew, supra note 97.
John Gapper, The Feds Must Cast Their Net Wisely, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2010, at 15.
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questioned rule 10b5-2, noting that it conflates a confidentiality agreement
with a fiduciary-like relationship. 175 The court went on to note that in some
cases, a confidentiality agreement could give rise to a fiduciary-like duty,
but only one including terms that bore the hallmarks of such a duty. 176
Several of the charges against former Primary Global Research consultants
contained the phrase, “non-disclosure agreements between [company x] and
[company y] governed all of this type of information,” 177 implying that any
non-disclosure agreement creates a fiduciary-like duty of trust and
confidence between the employee of the supplier and the customer.
The most recent cases of insider trading brought by the SEC have
focused more on the confidential nature of the information being passed to
analysts and less on the materiality of that information. 178 However, the
question of materiality is crucial since insider trading liability only ensues if
the misappropriated information is material. 179 Whether channel checking
remains a valid method of research will depend in large part on whether the
SEC expands the definition of materiality to include practically any
confidential information about a company.
1. Congress or the SEC Must Clarify the Definition of
Materiality
The lack of clarity over the definition of materiality has led to
confusion among large investors and accusations that the SEC intentionally
keeps the definition broad so it can decide what kinds of conduct to attack
without coming under attack for ex post lawmaking. 180 Some in the
financial industry reject this idea, claiming in essence that materiality is so
obvious that, as Justice Potter Stewart famously said, 181 one should “know
it when they see it.” 182 Stephen Taub claims that there is a wide gulf
between inside information and channel-checking activity, restricting the
term “channel check” to activities like visiting retail outlets and counting
cars in store parking lots. 183 This is an artificial limitation as the industry
often uses the term to refer to activities like calls to employees at supply or
customer companies. 184 The risk of the “know it when they see it”
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 1015.
E.g., Longoria Complaint, supra note 130, at 62.
Pulliam, supra note 1.
Henning, supra note 92.
Id.
Justice Potter Stewart famously noted that hard-core pornography was hard to define but
that he knew it when he saw it. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
182. Stephen Taub, Memo to Managed Funds Association: Don’t Trade on Insider Information,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Popups
/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=2760679.
183. Id.
184. See Sampath, supra note 83.
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definition of materiality is that it leaves open the possibility of judicial or
regulatory expansion. Even a good-faith effort to implement compliance
policies to prevent transmission of material information may not be enough
to avoid receiving such information and as such being subject to insider
trading liability. 185 For example, when a piece of information is just one
part of an investment thesis or analyst report but forms an important part of
the mosaic, 186 is it material? 187 After all, it does add to the total mix of
information, and it may be difficult to determine whether it adds
“significantly” or simply to some unspecified extent.
The SEC should provide a definition of what constitutes “material
information” for the purposes of insider trading liability, marking certain
types of information as clearly material and strictly off-limits for
discussion. A definition would not have to preclude the SEC from pursuing
actions for the sharing of non-listed items, but rather could provide a good
guide to investors and analysts to keep them out of trouble. Off-limits
information should include pre-release earnings numbers, cash flow figures,
and other important financial data. This may be done in conjunction with a
determination of materiality of at least some types of information. The
cases brought against experts and channel checkers at this point have
primarily involved clearly material information like pre-publication
earnings numbers. 188 There may come a time, though, when the materiality
of the information obtained by an analyst is not so clear. Channel checks by
their nature involve development of information that most investors do not
have, and a more even-handed approach would be for the SEC to develop
materiality guidelines to supplement the Court’s general definition of
materiality.
The Supreme Court has previously refused to adopt a bright-line test of
materiality in connection with alleged false and misleading statements made
in contravention of rule 10b-5. 189 In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,
a pharmaceutical company failed to disclose certain adverse events relating
to its cold remedy product and defended on the ground that the events were
statistically insignificant.190 The Court did not agree that an adverse event
must be statistically significant, holding that, since investors may act on a
non-statistically significant event, such an event, if disclosed, may be
deemed to have significantly altered the total mix of information available

185. See Evelyn M. Rusli, Amid Insider Trading Inquiries, Experts Get a Cold Shoulder, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, at B4.
186. See supra Part III.B.
187. Henning, supra note 92.
188. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Impact of the Latest Insider Trading Convictions, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 18, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/theimpact-of-the-latest-insider-trading-convictions/.
189. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313–14 (2011).
190. Id. at 1310.
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to an investor. 191 This is a signal that the Court wishes to reserve for itself
broad discretion in determining what information is material.
Not everyone in the SEC thought it wise to leave the definition of
materiality open to interpretation. 192 Former SEC chairman John Shad
attempted to draft a definition of materiality ahead of the passage of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act but was unable to do so before the legislation
was passed in 1983. 193 Senator Donald Riegel, Chair of the Subcommittee
on Securities, spoke out in favor of such a definition, noting that the courts
have interpreted the current test inconsistently:
Unfortunately, the courts have not interpreted fraud as it relates to insider
trading with any degree of consistency or clarity. As a result, not even
lawyers, let alone members of the public, can be sure from one court case
to another what the state of the law actually is in this area . . . . I think
194
that’s really an unacceptable situation and has to be changed.

The last attempt to impose a definition on the question of materiality
was defeated by the fear that a savvy trader or defense lawyer would find a
way around it. 195 This Note argues that such a fear is unjustified, as long as
the SEC is willing to limit itself to situations in which illegal insider trading
has actually occurred and refrains from pursuing traders who either lack a
duty to any issuer or have simply collected enough information to attain an
advantage not shared by the general public. To keep the current definition is
to have a rule without limit, which the Supreme Court disapproved in Dirks
v. SEC. 196
B. SAFE HARBOR WHEN SCIENTER CANNOT BE SHOWN
The most glaring problem with aggressively prosecuting analysts for
channel-checking-related insider trading is that it may cast too wide a net
and include those who unintentionally obtain misappropriated information.
Liability for insider trading under the misappropriation theory, the only
conceivable grounds for a prosecution flowing from channel-checking
activities, requires willful breach of a recognized duty. 197 In the case of a
channel check, the original duty would necessarily lie with the insider
passing along information to the analyst.198 In order for liability to pass to
the analyst as a tippee, that analyst would have to receive the information
knowing that the insider violated a duty not to disclose it.199 This creates a
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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catch-22 for the analyst since confidentiality agreements are often
themselves subject to confidentiality, preventing the insider from disclosing
whether he has a duty to keep certain information secret.200
Expert networks are also a problem since high compensation for
providing information about a company may incentivize consultants to
provide information covered by a confidentiality agreement without
disclosing such an agreement. 201 Some former expert network consultants
charge that their former employers would intentionally neglect to ask about
any confidentiality agreements in order to try to avoid the scienter element
of insider trading liability. 202
In order to avoid the prosecution of innocent analysts, the SEC should
carve out an exemption for those who legitimately were not aware that their
source was speaking in violation of a duty of trust and confidence to the
customer of the source’s company. This could be accomplished by working
with industry compliance experts to formulate the appropriate questions and
disclosures that analysts may ask sources to determine what sorts of
information they are permitted to share. Investment professionals have
already begun beefing up compliance programs and examining their
communications with supply-chain personnel to avoid liability for insider
trading. 203
In the past, the SEC has worked with regulated entities on thorny issues
like channel checking. When high-frequency trading firms became
controversial because of the 2010 “flash crash” attributed to their trading
style, the SEC solicited input from such firms to better understand how to
tailor regulations that would be effective and fair. 204 Recently, highfrequency trading has come under fire from some Wall Street traders, who
accuse firms of using the strategy to front-run other investors without
providing any useful capital to corporate participants in the equity
markets. 205 By contrast, channel checks are used to evaluate the long-term
financial health and growth potential of a particular company—a slow and
analytical process designed to evaluate the most efficient allocation of
investment capital. A discussion of the relative merits of high frequency
trading and long-term investment is beyond the scope of this Note, but if
the SEC is willing to collaborate with high-frequency trading firms, it
should be willing to work with investors who use channel checks.
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CONCLUSION
The debate over whether channel checking and the use of expert
networks should be legal involves a policy-based and technical analysis of
the insider trading laws. It forces us to look at the tension between a purely
fairness-based system, where the government ensures that all market
participants have access to exactly the same information at the same time,
and a purely efficiency-based system, where information about a given
security is impounded in its price the moment it is created or becomes
known. 206 The answer, I think, lies somewhere between these two extremes.
It does no good to enforce a pure fairness standard because to do so
damages the efficiency of the markets, exposes market participants to
nearly unlimited risk at the discretion of the SEC, and allows companies
with adverse events to hide them from the public, if not forever, at least for
some time. Such a standard is also contrary to established law at the
Supreme Court level. At the same time, it is against our social conscience to
allow some in-the-know individuals to profit at the expense of those who
have limited access to inside information.
The incentive to make large amounts of money will always induce
some to violate the law. 207 However, it undermines our market system
when, in search of those bad actors, we punish those who work to develop
and disseminate independent research. Instead, the government and the
securities industry should work towards a more tailored approach that
allows the government to police bad actors and gives securities
professionals an idea of where the “line” is that separates legal from illegal
conduct. Perfect efficiency and perfect fairness are difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve; however, there is much to be said for an attempt to
balance both. The key is to find a solution that does not shut down
securities markets by over-regulation of legitimate, in-depth research, but
leaves tools for the SEC and U.S. Department of Justice to discipline those
who have actually misappropriated material, non-public information.
Marron C. Doherty *
206. See ARSHADI & EYSELL, supra note 13, at 36.
207. Tamar Frankel, Self-Regulation of Insider-Trading in Mutual Funds and Advisers, 8

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 80 (2013) (“People who deal with money are usually hungry for
more money. For such people there is never enough. For people who are envious of richer people,
there are always those who have more.”).
* B.A., Amherst College, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014. I would like to
thank my family for their support during the writing and editing process. Although they were
occasionally mystified by my need to bring sources and the Bluebook on vacation, they stuck with
me through it all. I would also like to thank Josh and Elizabeth, my EIC and ME, for their patience
and great work editing my Note. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Hal Liebes of Fred Alger
Management. During my first summer of law school, Hal asked me to research the law of insider
trading as it related to channel checking. Finding very little on the subject, I was inspired to write
this Note. Without Hal, and Alger, this Note never would have been.

